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INTRODUCTION

A Texas lawyer desiring to place an advertisement in the Yellow
Pages to offer legal services within a particular area of the law faces
significant obstacles. Not only must he ensure that the ad conveys the
correct image of the firm to prospective clients and does not unduly
subject him or his colleagues to professional opprobrium for being too
"commercial," he must also comply with a number of specific requirements imposed by the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility.I
Two of the more dogging Code provisions - and the only two upon
which this article will focus - are subsections (B) and (C) of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-101,2 which apply to all forms of advertising media,

including printed media, radio, and television.' Pursuant to these
provisions, several attorneys placing Yellow Pages ads have recently
been issued private reprimands.4 One attorney, placing a newspaper
1. See

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art.

X, § 9 (Code of Professional Responsibility) DR 2-101(B),(C) (1984) [hereinafter cited as
TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]. All references to Disciplinary Rules
(DRs) or Ethical Considerations (ECs) refer to those contained in the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility unless otherwise noted. Ethical Considerations are non-binding, aspirational statements of objectives toward which each member of the profession should strive.
Disciplinary Rules, in contrast, are mandatory in character, and define minimum standards of
conduct which must be adhered to by all attorneys.
2. See TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1982) (lawyer publicity and advertising).
3. See id DR'2-101(B) (applies to publishing, advertising, or broadcasting); STATE
BAR
OF TEXAS, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-10

(1982) [hereinafter cited as STATE BAR OF TEXAS ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS] (listing and
detailing affected media).
4. Most of the cases have emanated from the Tenth Bar District, which covers the San
Antonio area. See 48 TEX. B. J. 80, 80 (1985) (attorney privately reprimanded for violation of
DR 2-101(C()(2)); id. at 207 (attorney privately reprimanded for violation of DR 2-101(B) and
(C)(2)); id. at 582 (attorney privately reprimanded for violation of DR 2-101(C)(2)); see also 47
TEX. B.J. 1253, 1253 (1984) (15 attorneys privately reprimanded for violations of DR 2101(C)(2)); id. at 1368-69 (two attorneys privately reprimanded for violations of DR 2l0l(C)(2)); id. at 1368-69 (attorney privately reprimanded for violation of DR 2-101(B) and 2101(C)(2)); id. at 1368-69 (12 attorneys privately reprimanded for violations of DR 2101(C)(2)); id. at 1368-69 (attorney privately reprimanded for violation of DR 2.101(B) and
(C)(1) and (2)).
In addition, at least two other recent cases from District 6, covering the Dallas area, appear
to have involved the same provisions, though it is unclear whether the ads were placed in the
Yellow Pages as opposed to other print media. See 47 TEX. B.J. 169, 169 (1984) (attorney
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ad, has been subjected to a judicial proceeding which would have resulted in suspension from practice for six months if the initial trial
court judgment had been upheld, and another attorney has been suspended for four months for a violation of DR 2-101(C). 5 Conceivably
in more aggravated cases, particularly ones involving repeated violations or other unethical conduct, more stringent penalties might be
imposed.
Subsection (B) provides that:
A lawyer who publishes, advertises, or broadcasts with regard to any
area of the law in which he practices must, with respect to each area of
the law so advertised, publish or broadcast the name of the lawyer, licensed to practice law in Texas, who shall be responsiblefor the performance of the legal service in the area of the law so advertised.
Presumably, in some instances, this requirement may be easy to
satisfy. For example, in the case of a solo practitioner, all that seems
necessary is to list the name of the attorney. As the size of the firm
increases and the areas of practice multiply, however, the task takes
on ever more formidable proportions, until at some point compliance
seems virtually impossible. Where, for example, there are no rigid
lines demarcating areas of practice, and lawyers within a firm move
from field to field as the demands for particular types of work ebb and
flow - one day litigating a personal injury claim and the next writing
a will - how is it possible to state with certainty before clients come
into the office "who shall be responsible for the performance of the
legal service" in a given area? This perplexing situation is compounded further by the requirements of subsection (C), which mandate that detailed statements be included concerning whether the
individuals named in compliance with subsection (B) are certified by
the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. The likely result is that the
Yellow Pages ad will be a tangle of disclaimers, provisos, and foot-

privately reprimanded, apparently under DR 2-101(C), for failing to disclaim criminal law
certification in ad offering "$250 Misdemeanor DWI"); id. at 169 (attorney privately reprimanded, presumably under DR 2-101(B) and (C), for failing to disclaim family law certification in ad stating "Divorce $75" and for failing to name "who shall be responsible for the
performance of the legal services in the area of family law which was advertised").
5. See State Bar of Texas v. Daves, No. 84-504190 (Dist. Ct. of Lubbock County, 237th
Judicial District of Texas, July 12, 1984) (violating DR 2-101(C)(2), six month suspension),
rev'd and rem., 691 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.); State Bar of
Texas v. Looney, No. 84-504318 (Dist. Ct. of Lubbock County, 237th Judicial District of
Texas, April 30, 1985) (violation of DR 2-101(C), four month suspension).
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notes,6 if the project is not entirely abandoned.
A practitioner's attempt to comply with the subsections is especially perilous in view of the fact that there is virtually no scholarship
or precedent on how subsection (B) should be interpreted and only
limited guidance bearing upon subsection (C). 7 In response to these
predicaments, this article will attempt to chart, from an academic's
perspective, a safe course between the Scylla and Charybdis of DR 2101(B) and (C), which it is hoped may assist both practicing attorneys
and those charged with enforcing these requirements.
6. In some instances, the results have verged on the ridiculous. For example, one ad
published in a recent edition of the Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages for the San Antonio Area
(August 1983-84, p. 84) employed a barrage of symbols (including asterisks, dots, single
crosses, and double crosses) in an attempt (likely unsuccessful) to guide the dazed reader
through a maze of qualifications and clarifications indicating which of three attorneys practiced in which of seven areas of the law, whether certification was available in those areas, and
if so which attorneys were certified.
7. No written guidance for practitioners was generated by the cases from the Tenth Bar
District. See 48 Tex. B.J. 80, 207, 582 (1985); 47 TEX. B.J. 1253, 1368-69 (1984). In each
proceeding, the local Grievance Committee apparently made an initial determination that the
ads violated the Code and then notified the attorneys involved of that assessment, without
venturing any advisory opinion concerning code requirements and compliance. Rather than
contest the Committee's interpretation, which could have led to the initiation of court proceedings, all of the attorneys agreed to accept private reprimands. At no point was any writing
issued by the local Committee that would indicate precisely why it believed the ads were not in
compliance with the Disciplinary Rules. Telephone interview with Arch Adams, Chairman of
the Tenth District Grievance Committee (Feb. 15, 1985); ¢f SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS,
RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art. X, § 14(B) (1984) (detailing grievance

committee judgment); id. art. X, § 14(B) (trial de novo in district court where attorney does
not accept proposed judgment). Unfortunately, the brief reports of the private reprimands
printed in the Texas Bar Journal fail to illuminate the Committee's construction of the disputed provisions.
It is not evident whether similar procedures were followed in the cases from District 6,
though the structure of the State Bar Rules makes that likely. As to the District 6 proceedings, the disciplinary action summaries published in the Texas Bar Journal are again very short
and only slightly more helpful.
The Daves case was decided at the trial level without opinion. Daves' early procedural history and selected contentions of counsel have been briefly discussed in an outside article. See
Lawyers'Ads FrayLingers in Court, THE TEX. LAW. Apr. 10, 1985, at 8. The appellate court
decision in Doves did issue an opinion. See State Bar of Texas v. Daves, 691 S.W.2d 784, 784
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.). The opinion dealt, however, more with procedural matters and the constitutionality of the lawyer advertising rules, than with interpreting
the provision in question, subsection (C). See id. at 789-90 (contested ad contained no language complying with subsection (C); no occasion for court to interpret provision).
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SUBSECTION

(B): NAMING THE RESPONSIBLE ATTORNEY

A. Background and Preliminaries
Subsection (B), adopted by the Texas Supreme Court on July 21,
1982 and effective September 1 of that year,8 appears to be unique to
the Texas Code. No similar provision is to be found in the code of
any other state, 9 and none is contained in either the old Model Code
8. Following the landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 372 (1977), which held that non-misleading, truthful advertising
concerning the prices of routine legal services was constitutionally protected, referenda were
twice put before the members of the State Bar of Texas to revise the rules on lawyer advertising
that had been in effect since 1971. See 41 TEx. B.J. 760, 760 (1978) (referendum put before the
bar in 1978); 43 TEX. B.J. 689, 689 (1980) (referendum on lawyer advertising again placed
before the bar in 1980). Both failed because on each occasion ballots were cast by less than
51% of those eligible to vote. See 41 TEX. B.J. 760, 760 (1978) (only 12,470 of 30,522 voted);
43 TEX. B.J. 689, 689 (1980) (41% of eligible attorneys voted). After the first defeat, the
Supreme Court suspended DR 2-101 and 2-102 to the extent that they conflicted with Bates.
See Zunker, Lawyer Advertising, Solicitation and Trade Names Since Bates, 43 TEX. B.J. 321,
321 (1980). Following the second defeat, a State Bar committee drafted yet another proposed
revision of the Code, which took into account relevant developments since Bates. See Cunningham, Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 45 TEX. B.J. 938, 938 (1982). After slight modifications of the new draft by the Board of Directors, the State Bar presented the draft to the
Supreme Court and petitioned the court to hold a third referendum or alternatively exercise its
inherent nomothetic powers over the practice of law and judicially promulgate new advertising
rules. See id. at 938. The Supreme Court chose the latter course, repealing former Disciplinary Rules 2-101 through 2-105, and enacting Disciplinary Rules 2-101 through 2-104 as they
are presently worded. See Lawyer Advertising Guidelines,45 TEX. B.J. between 1110 and 1111
(special tear-out section) (1982). The provisions adopted by the Court varied in several respects from those proposed by the State Bar. As to DR 2-101(B), the difference is essentially
insignificant: whereas the State Bar version referred to "A lawyer who publishes or broadcasts," the provision enacted by the Supreme Court speaks of "A lawyer who publishes, advertises, or broadcasts" (emphasis added). The variation between the proposed and adopted
versions of DR 2-101(C) is more extensive and is discussed in subsection C of this paper.
There is no legislative history or commentary to illuminate the meaning of either the provisions submitted to the Court or those promulgated. Telephone interview with Jerry Zunker,
General Counsel, State Bar of Texas (Feb. 19, 1985). A constitutional challenge to the manner
in which the advertising rules were adopted was raised and rejected in State Bar of Texas v.
Daves, 691 S.W.2d 784, 788-89 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (defendant's
claim that court was without rule making power was negated by statutes).
9. The most comprehensive compilation of state rules governing the practice of law appears to be the NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, published by University Publications of America (1984). It contains the codes of all states
plus the District of Columbia. A review of the advertising provisions for each jurisdiction, as
updated with supplements made available to subscribers through early 1985, fails to disclose
any requirements paralleling the dictates of DR 2-101(B) of the Texas Code. At least one state
provides that a firm may not advertise an area of practice unless that designation is properly
attributable to all attorneys in the firm. See CONNECTICUT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(A)(4)(b). Another state, while allowing a firm to advertise a specialized
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(on which the current codes of Texas

and most other jurisdictions are based) or the new Model Rules of
Professional Conduct" (adopted by the American Bar Association
(ABA) House of Delegates in August 1983 and now under considera-

tion in numerous jurisdictions).' 2 Further, no judicial precedent or
scholarly guidance is to be found. No state or federal decision has

ever discussed the subsection, 13 and no reference to it has been made
in periodic literature 14 or in the ethics opinions of the State Bar of
Texas or the Dallas County Bar Association that would significantly
area of practice when fewer than all attorneys meet stated requirements for specialization,
provides that the firm's Yellow Pages advertisement cannot list the names of those who do not
qualify as specialists. See NEW MEXICO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2105(B)(7). But by their very terms, these rules are clearly distinguishable from DR 2-101(B) of
the Texas Code. See TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (advertisement must state name of attorney responsible for legal service); cf id. DR 2-101(C)(2)
(Texas specialization rules).
A caveat is in order: as supplemented through early 1985, the National Reporter failed to
include the Texas advertising rules adopted in July 1982. Consequently, the compilation does
not appear to be fully up-to-date.
10. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, reprintedin THE BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ 01:301-347 (1985).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted in VII MARTINDALEHUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VIII, at 1-41 (1985). Rule 7.2, which pertains to advertising, provides in subsection (b) that "Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall
include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content." See id. Rule 7.2. The
official Comment to Rule 7.2 does not elaborate on that requirement. The language employed
in the subsection seems clearly distinguishable in terms of objectives from that used in DR 2101(B) of the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility. Logically it would tend to ensure
that an attorney, rather than an office assistant, be responsible for the correctness of the ad,
and in addition would readily identify who might be subjected to disciplinary action in case the
ad violated applicable provisions. A requirement necessitating that the attorney responsible
for the provision of services be named would not necessarily advance these same objectives, for
it says nothing about responsibility for the placement of the ad. The Model Code Comparison
annotation accompanying Rule 7.2 indicates that there was no counterpart to Rule 7.2(d) in
the old Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
12. See STATUS REPORT ON CONSIDERATION OF MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, ABA (July 4, 1985).
13. The annotations for DR 2-101 contained in Vernon's 1985 pocketpart reveal no cases
referring to subsection (B). See TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101
(1984). Similarly, no precedent citing this provision was revealed by a search of the Texas and
federal databases for Lexis and Westlaw on July 15, 1985.
14. The Vernon's supplement to DR 2-101, reveals only one law review article written
after the adoption of the provisions in question in 1982: Galton, The New Advertising Rules:
Accentuating the Negative?, 45 TEX. B.J. 1420, 1420 (1982). The article makes no reference to
subsection B. A search of the Index to Legal Periodicals, through Vol. 78, No. 7, April 1985,
failed to disclose any other scholarly writings on the subject.
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illuminate its meaning. is Finally, because the provisions were
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas, rather than enacted by
the legislature, there is no legislative history to which resort can be
had. 16
In the absence of such authority, it is best to interpret the subsection reasonably, based on its plain language, in light of abundant constitutional precedent on lawyer advertising, which generally holds
that truthful information is entitled to First Amendment protection
17
and may not be unnecessarily impeded or suppressed.
At the outset, it seems possible to set aside certain potential constructions of subsection (B) as unreasonable and without merit. First,
it seems unlikely that by referring to advertisements made by a "lawyer," rather than by a law firm, the drafters meant to exempt from its
provisions ads placed on behalf of an entire firm, as opposed to an
individual. No plausible purpose would be served by allowing attorneys to escape the force of the subsection's requirements merely by
placing the ad in the firm's name instead of their own."8 Conversely,

15. The Dallas County Bar Association is the only local Texas Bar whose ethics opinions
are summarized, along with those of the State Bar of Texas, in the LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT published by ABA/BNA. The weekly updates of this looseleaf ser-

vice through May 15, 1985 disclose only one ethics opinion discussing subsection (B). See
Dallas County Bar Ass'n. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 6 (1983), summarized in THE BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

801:2075 (1985). The opinion held that the provisions of DR 2-101(B) and (C) apply to
listings of areas of practice which appear on stationary, but failed to otherwise interpret these
subsections. The opinion states that it is "strictly advisory in nature" and that the "Dallas Bar
Association can assume no liability. . . for any damage, loss or detriment suffered or incurred
as a result of reliance" thereon. See id. T 801:2075. The full text of the opinion is available at
the Southern Methodist University School of Law Library.
16. Telephone conversation with Jerry Zunker, General Counsel, State Bar of Texas ,
(Feb. 19, 1985) (confirming no legislative history compiled by State Bar of Texas).
17. See e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, U.S.....
105 S. Ct.
2265, 2283, 85 L.Ed.2d 652, 673 (1985) (non-deceptive illustration is constitutionally protected; state may require attorney offering contingent fees to disclose that client shall be liable
for costs even when there is no recovery); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("[t]ruthful
advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment");
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 435, 439 (1978) (state bar rule forbidding solicitation by mail
violates First Amendment); see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364, 383
(1977) (advertising by attorney not subject to blanket suppression, but rather, entitled to First
Amendment protections).
18. Some other jurisdictions have seen fit to expressly differentiate the types of ads which
may be placed by individual attorneys and firms. See NEW MEXICO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(B), reprinted in 3 NAT'L. REP. LEGAL ETHICS AND PROF.

RESPON. V2:NM8 (1978). No such differentiation is found in the Texas Code.
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it would impose an unduly strained reading on the language in question to conclude (in misreliance on the Latin maxim expressio unis est

exclusio alterius)19 that the drafters meant to permit individual practitioners to advertise areas of practice, but to prohibit such statements
on behalf of law firms. Such a reading might well raise serious doubts
about the constitutional validity of the provision, particularly in light

of First Amendment guarantees of freedom of expression and association, 20 and should not be indulged in the absence of clear support in
the text. Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that the section, by asking for disclosure of who will be responsible, is seeking more than a
listing of who would be subject to civil liability - presumably at least
the partners in the firm - in the case of malpractice. Had such been
the objective, more direct language could easily have been found, and
indeed, it is difficult to imagine what important interest would be ad-

vanced by imposing such a requirement. The subsection's reference
to "the" attorney "who shall be responsible for the performance of the
legal service" is probably directed at eliciting just that, disclosure of

who will be responsiblefor the performance of the services.21
Assuming then that a firm can advertise areas of practice and must
comply with the terms of subsection (B), what must be done? Are the
firm's only options to, on the one hand, state with specificity who will
be responsible or, on the other, remain silent if that is not possible?
While the subsection is susceptible to such rigid interpretation, it
should be rejected on several grounds.

19. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
521 (5th ed. 1979).
20. See n.27 & accompanying text infra..
21. See SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed.
1984) ("If the language is plain, unambiguous and uncontrolled by other parts of the act or
other acts upon the same subject the court cannot give it a different meaning"); id. at § 46.06
("effect must be given, if possible to every word, clause and sentence of a statute"); see also
City of El Paso v. Public Utility Comm'n, 609 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980,
writ refd n.r.e.) (where clear and unambiguous statute, court gives words common meaning);
cf Wessberg v. Beckman, 194 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (1959) (Meyer, J.) (quoting Lord Mildew in
Bluff v. Father Gray (A.P. Herbert, Uncommon Law 192), "'If Parliament does not mean
what it says, it must say so.' ").
Notwithstanding the fact that the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility is of judicial
rather than legislative origin, it is appropriate to apply standard rules of statutory construction
to the interpretation of its provisions. See Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 417 S.W.2d
625, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967) (Code "subject to rules of statutory construction"),
rev'd on other grounds, 432 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968); see also State Bar of Texas v. Edwards,
646 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("State Bar Rules
have the same effect as statutes"),
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As noted above, solo practitioners would likely have no difficulty
complying with such a construction. So too, the requirements might
easily be satisfied in the case of a small firm where each attorney predictably practices in a given field and does not, even from time to
time, work in other advertised areas of the law which are normally
handled by different attorneys. 22 For example, if at the three-person
law firm of A, B & C, A practices only personal injury law, B only
corporate law, and C only decedents' estates, presumably the ad could
satisfy the statute by indicating that A is responsible for providing
services to personal injury clients, B services to corporate clients, and
so forth. The difficulties with which we are concerned - namely, the
demands of complying with the Code in a way that does not compromise the visual effectiveness of the advertisement - will therefore
arise primarily when the number of attorneys is not so small and the
lines between multiple areas of practice not so clearly drawn. In such
instances, it may be impossible to state far in advance of the prospective client's walking in the door who will be responsible for providing
legal services in a particular area of the law. For example, in a nineperson firm, it may fall to attorney G, who normally performs business law services for commercial clients, to arrange a testamentary
disposition, simply because no one else is available. The question then
is whether firms without clearly defined areas of practice (particularly
middle-sized firms of that variety - firms that are not so small that
the problems of compliance are de minimis nor so large as to be likely
to eschew advertising in favor of more subtle forms of public relations) 23 should be precluded from advertising areas of practice merely
22. Yet even small firms may run into problems which, though technically capable of
resolution, may destroy the visual appeal, and thus the effectiveness, of the ad. The ability of
the ad to convey the right information efficiently and effectively is of course a matter of great

concern in view of the high cost of Yellow Pages advertising. In Spring 1985, Southwestern
Bell Telephone, covering the San Antonio area, charged attorneys $201.25 per month to place
a 2" x 2" ad in their forthcoming annual edition of the Yellow Pages. A half page ad cost
$1475.25 per month.
23. According to one survey, most of the attorneys who advertised came from firms with
three or fewer lawyers, whereas public relations activity was concentrated among firms of ten
or more lawyers. See Big Firms FavorP.R.; Little Firms Like Ads, 69 A.B.A.J. 892, 892 (July
1983). There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. Thus, Robert Habush, recently described
as "the head of [Wisconsin's] largest personal injury law firm" and "winner of the largest jury
verdict in [state] history," has gained national prominence for his "Knowing the Law" television "informercial" series. See Middleton, The Right Way to Advertise on TV 69 A.B.A.J.
893, 893-95 (July 1983). According to one consulting firm executive: "[A]n ad in television
guides, Yellow Pages or on matchbook covers is best for law firms that deal mainly with
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because of their inability to comply with a strict reading of the Code?
Clearly, the answer should be no. It is lawful, professionally appropriate, and indeed commonplace for attorneys, whatever the size of
firm, to occasionally be primarily responsible for performing work for
clients in areas other than those in which they normally practice. z4
Despite various trends toward specialization, this willingness to reach
beyond a narrow area of expertise remains a robust and vital part of
the legacy passed down from a day when all attorneys were general
practitioners.2 5 Indeed, it may be argued, and not unconvincingly,
that a result of non-specialized practice is a higher calibre of legal
services in general, on the premise that lawyers do a better job to the
extent that they have a more complete view of the legal landscape the type of view which results from broad exposure rather than selected specialization.
It is also lawful, professionally appropriate, and again commonplace for attorneys to elect to practice not on their own, but collectively in partnerships or professional corporations, 26 and it is at least
arguable that the public interest is in fact best served by the resulting
economies of scale. No one suggests that participation in such multiattorney units should be barred or otherwise penalized. Indeed, were
such a suggestion made, it might well be challenged on the ground
individuals. Law firms that have mainly corporate clients might do best to concentrate on
taking clients to lunch or providing other entertainment." See Bivens, Doctor, Lawyer Ads
Controversial,San Antonio Sunday Express-News Sept. 2, 1984, at I-N, col. 6.
24. The profession's willingness to permit attorneys to practice in areas other than those

in which they normally specialize is evidenced by Section 5.2 of the American Bar Association
Model Plan of Specialization (1979), reprintedas an appendix to Mindes, Proliferation,Special-

ization and Certification: The Splitting of the Bar, 11 TOLEDO L. REV. 273, 296 (1980):
5.2 No lawyer shall be required to be recognized as a specialist in order to practice in the
field of law covered by the specialty. Any lawyer, alone, or in association with any other
lawyer, shall have the right to practice in any field of law, even though he is or she is not

recognized as a specialist in that field.
Similarly, Section 5.1 states:
5.1 No standard shall be approved which shall in any way limit the right of a recognized
specialist to practice in all fields of law. Any lawyer, alone or in association with any
other lawyer, shall have the right to practice in all fields of law, even though he or she is
recognized as a specialist in a particular field of law.

Id.
25. See FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 145, 557-558 (1973) (discussing

generalist lawyers on the frontier).
26. A recent survey of those finishing law school in 1983 indicated that "[s]olo practitioners constituted only 4.3 percent of the graduates employed in private practice . . . [23.2 percent of those graduates however] work[ed] in firms having two to 10 lawyers." See Silas, No
Bread Lines, 71 A.B.A.J. 19, 19 (May 1985).
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that it tended unnecessarily to impinge upon the individual attorney's
right to work and constitutional freedom of association.27
The chief interest at stake with regard to lawyer advertising namely, the need on the part of the public for information as to the
availability and cost of legal services 28 -

is just as great with respect

to middle and large size firms as it is with regard to solo practitioners
and small collectives. An arrangement under which correct information is available with respect to the services available from lawyers in
the latter categories in no way obviates the need for data concerning
other alternatives for securing legal services.
Finally, and of great significance, a rigid reading of subsection (B)
should be eschewed because a more plausible and functional interpretation is readily available. It is possible to conceive of at least two
important objectives which the drafters may have intended to advance, and these objectives may be harmonized into a coherent interpretation of the "name the responsible attorney" provision.
B. Policy: Prevent "Client Baiting"
First, the drafters may well have intended to address what might be
referred to as the problem of "client baiting." Simply put, client baiting occurs when a firm prominently promotes the name or credentials
of one or more of its partners in the hope of attracting clients for
whom services are likely to be rendered by other, less experienced,
less qualified, less noted attorneys. To posit an extreme case, assume
27. As de Tocqueville wrote more than a century ago the "most natural privilege of man,

next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow
creatures and of acting in common with them." See DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 196 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). See generally N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 42829 (1963) (group legal practice protected by freedom of association); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 702 (3d ed. 1978) ("Freedom of expression embraces more than the
right of the individual to speak his mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his right to
join with his fellows in an effort to make that advocacy effective.").

28. As Judge Milton Shadur has written:
[T]he public interest lies in being informed in a way that will assist people in locating and

choosing a lawyer. Anything that informs the potential consumer about lawyers' qualifications has to rank high in what the public wants and is entitled to know.

Shadur, The Impact of Advertising and Specialization on ProfessionalResponsibility, 61-6 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 324, 328 (1980), quoted in, 67 WOMEN'S L.J. 23, 23 (1981); see also
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, U.S. , , 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2282, 85
L.Ed.2d 652, 673 (1985) ("The extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech

provides.").
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that F. Lee Bailey is a member of a firm which styles itself "The Law
Offices of F. Lee Bailey," under which name it widely advertises its
criminal law practice. Many clients may be drawn to the firm in the
expectation that the famous Mr. Bailey will handle their cases. In
fact, because of the size of the firm and the extent of its practice, it is
virtually certain that most clients will never meet the man, let alone
that he will be directly responsible for their representation. To the
extent that this is the case, the public, arguably, should be given a
more accurate representation of what they can expect. In particular,
it may be important for the firm to disclose not only the possibility
that the client is not certain to secure Mr. Bailey's services, but also
the names or at least the number of the other attorneys who might in
fact be chiefly responsible for serving the client. As their number varies the probability will increase or decrease that the named luminary
will ever be consulted by the attorney directly responsible and also
that the client will be shunted from one lawyer to another during the
period of his representation.
Similar problems of client baiting may of course arise with regard
to specialty certification. If, as under the Code,29 the firm is permitted
to advertise the fact that one or more attorneys are board certified in
particular areas when in fact services may be rendered by non-certified members of the firm, there is potential for misleading the public.
By adopting DR 2-101(B), the court may well have intended to prevent this type of deception.
C.

Policy: Deter Unnecessary Brokering of Legal Services

Second, the provision can arguably be read as at least a partial attempt to prevent the unnecessary brokering of legal services. The
profession as a whole tends to recognize that, on appropriate occasions, it is desirable for an attorney who is not sufficiently familiar
with a given field of law to refer clients to another lawyer possessing a
greater degree of expertise. The assumption is that the referral normally will result in the rendition of a higher quality of legal services
and thus greater client satisfaction. 0 To facilitate the process and

29. Cf

TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(C) (1984).
30. See, e.g., R. ARONSON & D. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

242-243

(1980) (rule against referral fees unrealistic because of practice to contrary and may discourage
lesser qualified lawyers from parting with the case); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 99 (1978) ("the effect ... is to steer claimants to specialists, which is advantageous to
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ease the economic penalty that inevitably results from sending business elsewhere, some states ethically permit referring attorneys to recover some fee merely for making the referral.3" Indicative of this
willingness, DR 2-107(A) (2) of the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that a fee may be shared with an attorney outside the firm without regard to the proportion of services
performed or responsibility assumed. The fact that the profession is
willing to permit such payments in appropriate cases, however, does
not inevitably mean that it is willing to tolerate the unnecessary bro32

kering of legal services.
Where an attorney seeks to make a steady business of attracting
clients merely for the purpose of sending them elsewhere so that he
may collect referral fees, it may be in the best interest of both society
and the profession for the Bar to police its ranks. To the extent that
forwarding arrangements add an unnecessary layer of middlemen to
the provision of legal services, they exacerbate a critical problem besetting those who need the assistance of the profession, namely, unaf-

the client"); Note, Attorneys: The ReferralFee: A Split of Opinion, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 628, 633
(1980) (overall effect may help client by encouraging referral to attorney most likely to gain
largest recovery); see also Halstrom, Referral Fees are a Necessary Evil, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 42
(Feb. 1985) ("Clients benefit because their claims are placed in the hands of a competent expert
with the financial integrity to prosecute the claim.").
31. For example, in 1979 California deleted from its Code a provision requiring that a
division of fees with a referring attorney must be "made in proportion to the services performed or responsibility assumed by each [lawyer]." See Moran v. Harris, 131 Cal. App. 3d
913, 916 n.2, 182 Cal. Rptr. 519, 520 n.2 (1982) (holding that in absence of an express disciplinary prohibition a forwarding fee arrangement was not contrary to public policy). The only
other states permitting straight referral fees are Massachusetts, Maine, and Texas. See Referral Fees: Everybody Does It But Is It Okay, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (Feb. 1985) (straight referral
fees allowed only in California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Texas). In the remaining jurisdictions, the referral fee must generally be based on the amount of work performed or responsibility assumed by the referring attorney. See Franck, No Referral Feefor No Work, 71 A.B.A. J.
40, 42 (Feb. 1985) (lawyer shouldn't accept fee for not working on legal matter that he or she
realizes he or she shouldn't accept).
32. This problem has been the subject of recent comment. See Franck, No Referral Fee
for No Work, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 42 n.29 (Feb. 1985) ("potential for profit has spawned private
for-profit referral enterprises in the few states [including Texas] that impose no constraints on
referral fees"). One commentator has stated:
The advent of the TV broker attorney presents an offensive situation in which a wellfunded lawyer can solicit cases by the airwaves and forward the resulting case to qualified
attorneys for handling. A law degree and an advertising scheme are all that are required
to share in a percentage of the resulting fees.
Halstrom, Referral Fees Are a Necessary Evil, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 43 n.28 (Feb. 1985).
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fordability.3 3 While one may colorably contend that "referral
specialists" can perform a valuable service by directing laymen to
firms well suited to meeting their particular needs, it is also likely that
many r~ferring attorneys will be actuated not by the clients' best interests but by who is likely to pay the highest referral fee. 34
Any interpretation of subsection (B) must take into account those
provisions in the Code which expressly permit the occasional payment
of referral fees, for in statutory construction, meaning must be given
to each portion of the statute 5 and each section must be construed in
light of the overall context in which it appears.3 6 In addition, a
proper interpretation of subsection (B) should not be blind to the potential abuses in referral arrangements if there is opportunity to take
such matters into account. The relevant question to ask with regard
to the interplay of subsection (B) and DR 2-107(A)(2) is whether it is
a violation of the Code for an attorney, who has advertised an area of
practice and named himself as the responsible attorney, to forward
the case to another lawyer upon finding that it involves special difficulties beyond his expertise. Strictly speaking, where such referrals
occur, the ad has failed to disclose the name of the attorney ultimately
responsible for providing legal services.
Clearly, nothing in the Code forbids a finding that such conduct
violates the Code, for there is no express guarantee that one can both
advertise areas of practice and refer clients. Yet, on the other hand,

33. The president of Harvard University recently wrote as follows regarding unaffordability of legal services:
[Tihe cost of hiring a lawyer and the mysteries of the legal process discourage most people
of modest means from trying to enforce their rights. . . . The blunt, inexcusable fact is
that this nation, which prides itself on efficiency and justice, has developed a legal system
that is the most expensive in the world, yet cannot manage to protect the rights of most of
its citizens.
Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG. 38, 40 (May-June 1983).
34. The amounts involved are not insubstantial. Writing in 1978, one authority on legal
ethics stated as follows: "In personal injury referrals in many parts of the country, the standard arrangement is that the entire fee is a contingent one-third of the claimant's recovery and
that this fee is divided one-third to the referring lawyer and two-thirds to the specialist." HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 98-99 (1978). Other scholars have placed the referral
percentages at varying amounts. See Franck, No Referral Feefor No Work, 71 A.B.A. J. 40,
44 n.29 (Feb. 1985) (20% to 33 1/3%); Halstrom, Referral Fees Are a Necessary Evil, 71
A.B.A. J. 40, 43 n.28 (Feb. 1985) (25% to 50%).
35. See SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.0-6 (4th ed.
1984).
36. See id. § 46.05 (construe each section with all other sections in order to produce
harmonious whole).
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there is no scholarly or judicial support for such a view, and indeed
the view seems to run counter to the policies underlying the constitutional protection of lawyer advertising and the policies which favor
the making of referrals in appropriate cases. Put differently, if there
are important interests to be advanced by advertising areas of legal
practice and by referring clients to lawyers possessing greater expertise, then the relevant provisions should be interpreted in a manner
which does not unduly handicap either of these interests.
A reasonable course for determining when the referral of clients
gives rise to a violation of the "name the responsible attorney" provision would be to read into Subsection (B) a requirement of good faith.
It would tend to single out for discipline the most egregious cases and
to disregard the others. Specifically, if an attorney has previously
practiced in an area of the law and intends to continue the same, or if
he plans to become competent therein, or even if he intends to associate with a more experienced attorney who will be able to assist him in
meeting clients' needs, then the statement in his advertisement that he
will be the responsible attorney is made in good faith and there is no
violation.37 If, however, the attorney has no experience in the field
and no plans to become proficient in the area or otherwise meet the
clients' needs, and merely intends to refer to others the clients he attracts, then good faith has not been shown and different treatment is
appropriate. That is, at some point there is simply no factual basis for
an attorney to assert that he will be the responsible attorney. In such
instances, the attorney's abuse of the referral system should be discouraged at least to the point of prohibiting him from attracting clients by advertising areas of practice, and if he persists in so doing, he
should be subject to discipline. Under this view, the provision does
not so much provide bright-line guidance for those placing ads as furnish a standard for case-by-case review once the ad isfait accompli. It
37. An interesting comparison is comment [2] to Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which in addressing the attorney's duty to provide competent representation

states:
"A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal
problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. . . . A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established

competence in the field in question."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.1, comment (2) (1983), reprintedin THE
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT

§ 1:101 (1985).
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relates more to whether one has colorably stated an honest intention
of accepting clients in the advertised area than to whether one has
precisely predicted who would perform the work for each client.
D. A Proposalfor Compliance
Mindful of the foregoing considerations concerning lack of precedent and plausible lines of interpretation, the question still remains as
to what statements a practitioner should include in a Yellow Pages ad
to comply with subsection (B). In particular, if it cannot be stated in
advance, in good faith and with specificity, who will provide the legal
services in the advertised area, what information should be sufficient
to comply with the Code?
Until there is controlling precedent to the contrary, it would seem
to be adequate and appropriate for an ad to seek to satisfy the Code's
requirements by naming each of the attorneys in the firm, then including a statement along the following lines: "The attorneys responsible
for providing legal services to a particular client are designated on an
individual case basis." By so doing, the ad would be sure to have
literally named the responsible attorney. Moreover, it will have fully
apprised potential clients of the fact that there is no advance guarantee that they will be served by a particular attorney - which, as noted
above, is especially important in view of the problems of client baiting
and the fact that subsection (C) mandates that information be included indicating whether each named attorney is or is not board certified in the advertised area of practice.
Obviously, it will be rather cumbersome in some cases to list all of
the attorneys in a firm with their respective certification credentials in
a relatively small Yellow Pages advertisement.3" Rather than so doing, would it be sufficient to simply include the statement quoted
above and then state how many attorneys there are in the firm?

38. Presumably, the typeface employed in the ad must be sufficiently large to be discernible by those interested in reading it. With respect to subsection (B)'s sister provision, subsection (C), the Texas Code states that "Such statements [concerning disclaimer of certification]
must be displayed conspicuously so as to be easily seen or understood by any consumer. See
TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(C)(2). Of course, context must
be taken into account, and phone book typeface is typically very small. A sense of how a
statement such as the one suggested in the text concerning assignment of attorneys on an
individual case basis might be undistractingly placed in a Yellow Pages ad may be gained by
analogizing to the Surgeon General's warnings contained in cigarette advertisements. Typically the warnings are placed in smaller than usual print in the limbic portions of the layout.
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Would this not be sufficient to inform clients of what to expect? To
these questions, there is no simple answer. Subsection (B) expressly
requires the lawyer placing the ad to "publish or broadcast the name
of the lawyer . . . who shall be responsible."

(Emphasis added).

Strickly speaking, listing only the number of lawyers in the firm
would not comply with this mandate, even if their certification credentials could otherwise be made clear. While the subsection might
be challenged as unconstitutionally broad on the ground that United
States Supreme Court precedent generally provides that the government may regulate commercial speech by lawyers only where there is
a substantial interest at stake and that "restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary," 3 9 it is uncertain
whether such an argument would be successful. The Court has recently held that provisions requiring the inclusion (rather than exclusion) of information stand on different footing and normally are not
subject to the least restrictive means test, 4° but has reserved the question of whether a different rule should apply when disclosure requirements are unreasonably burdensome.41 Where such burden can be
shown, it could plausibly be maintained that the language of the provision is excessively broad, that the proposed disclosures are sufficient
to prevent client baiting or deter unnecessary brokering of legal services, and that in going further the Code is, to that extent, unconstitutional. Presumably, an attorney who in the absence of any precedent
on the question takes this position would be unlikely to be subjected
to serious disciplinary sanctions, for even if the subsection were found
to advance other goals sufficient to justify a literal reading of the statute, it could be argued that until so interpreted the provision was
unenforceably vague. As Justice William Brennan has written for the
Court in a different, albeit analogous, context, "[s]tricter standards of
permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a
potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required
to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be

39. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04 & n.15 (1982).
40. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, - U.S.....
105 S. Ct. 2265, 2282-83,
85 L.Ed. 2d 652, 672-73 (1985) (disclosure requirements need only be reasonably related to
state's interest in preventing deception of consumers).
41. See id. at - & n.15, 105 S. Ct. at 2282 & n.15, 85 L.Ed. 2d at 673 & n.15 (holding
attorney failed to show that disclosure requirement was intrinsically burdensome and
unreasonable).
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the loser."' 42 To hold otherwise would be to risk chilling important
First Amendment rights.4 a
III.

SUBSECTION

C: DISCLOSING CERTIFICATION

OR THE LACK THEREOF

Subsection (C) of DR 2-101 provides as follows:
Each lawyer whose name is published, advertised, or broadcast pursuant
to DR 2-101(B):
(1) Who has been awardeda Certificate of Special Competence by the
Texas Board of Legal Specialization in the area so advertised must state
with respect to each area, "Board Certified, (area of specialization) Texas Board of Legal Specialization."
(2) Who has not been awarded a Certificate of Special Competence by
the Texas Board of Legal Specialization in the area so advertised must
state with respect to each area, "Not Certified by the Texas Board of
Legal Specialization." Where the area so advertised has not been designated as an area in which a lawyer may be awarded a Certificate of
Special Competence by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, the
lawyer may also state, "No designation has been made by the Texas
Board of Legal Specialization for a Certificate of Special Competence in
this area." Such statements must be displayed conspicuously so as to be
easily seen or understood by any consumer. (emphasis added)
These provisions were promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court in
1982 at the same time and in the same manner as subsection (B)."
42. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (sales of allegedly obscene

literature).
43. The same constitutional considerations are applicable to another aspect of lawyer advertising. Many firms, apparently in a good faith attempt to comply with the terms of subsec-

tion (B), presently run ads which name all of the attorneys in the firm. Arguably, as suggested
above, it would be preferable to also indicate who precisely will provide services in each advertised area or to state the attorney who will be assigned on an individual case basis. In the
absence of such additional statements, should such firms now be subject to disciplinary action?
It would clearly seem that to the extent that they have reasonably endeavored to interpret and
comply with the applicable provision, and in the absence of guiding precedent, scholarship, or
statutory history, the answer should be no.
44. As adopted, subsection (C) differs from the version of that rule proposed to the
Supreme Court by the State Bar in three respects: (1) the word "advertised," set off by commas, was added to the first sentence by the Supreme Court; (2) in the second sentence of
subdivision (C)(2) the words "'The naming of an area of practice does not necessarily imply
expertise in such an area of practice' "were deleted and the words" 'Not certified by the Texas
Board of Legal Specialization'" were substituted; and (3) the final sentence of subdivision
(C)(2), not contained in the proposed draft, was added by the Supreme Court. Because there is
no judicial history behind the Court's adoption of the present provisions, it is impossible to
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Although there is no interpretive judicial history of subsection (C), it
is fair to conclude that the language was intended to minimize confusion in the eyes of the public that might result when an attorney advertises an area of practice. Absent further explanation, such a
statement could be read as suggesting that the attorney has special
expertise, or at least prior experience, in the designated area neither of which is necessarily true.45 By mandating the inclusion of
further information, the subsection makes at least a partial attempt to
address these problems, though whether it is successful is of course
open to debate. The argument has been made that because certification does not necessarily establish superiority of legal skill, nor lack of
certification inevitably signal inferior ability, the provisions create as
much confusion as they dispel,46 and thus some attorneys have raised
constitutional doubts as to their validity.47 Assuming, however, that
there is a rational basis to support the means embraced by the court
for dealing with the problem,4" and setting any other constitutional
state, other than on the basis of conjecture, why these changes were made. It is worth noting
that if the original wording of the second sentence of subsection (C)(2) had been retained,
many of the problems discussed in the text would not arise. The difficulties presently encountered in resolving those problems strongly suggests that it might well be a feracious course for
that portion of the subsection to be amended so as to comport with the original proposal.
45. Cf State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of Code of Professional Responsibility Op. 424 (1985), reprinted in 48 TEX. B.J. 577, 577 (1985) (statement in ad that lawyer was
formerly a military attorney held to imply expertise in field of military law).
46. See Galton, The New Advertising Rules: Accentuating the Negative?, 45 TEx. B.J.
1420, 1420 (1982) (specialization or nonspecialization does not always denote lawyer
competency).
47. See id. at 1421 (constitutionality of specialization advertising requirement remains
open). In State Bar of Texas v. Daves, 691 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), the court declined to rule on various constitutional challenges to DR 2-101, stating
simply:
Accepting the Supreme Court's inherent power to adopt the rule, it is not our function as
an intermediate appellate court to nullify or alter it, for once the Court decides upon a
rule of law, the decision is, in the absence of a controlling decision by the United States
Supreme Court, binding on lower courts, until the Court changes the rule.
Id. at 789 (citations omitted).
48. To the extent that an argument of unconstitutionality is based on traditional equal
protection analysis, it would seem likely to fail, for it is well established that where there is any
rational basis for the rule adopted, courts will normally defer to executive and legislative expertise and the provision will be found ennomic. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, U.S. - ...
105 S. Ct. 2265, 2282, 85 L. Ed.2d 652, 673 (1985) ("Advertisers'
rights are adequately protected so long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
states' interest in preventing deception of consumers."); U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973) (if classification rationally related to legitimate interest, classification
stands); cf Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) ("[t]he Constitution does not
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doubts aside, it is possible to ask other questions more immediately
relevant to the practitioner:
(1) Must some statement concerning certification be made each
time there is any mention of an area of practice?
(2) Must the language concerning certification track verbatim the
terms quoted in the statute?
(3) Under what circumstances will a single statement concerning
an area of certification (e.g., "Personal Injury Trial Law") be deemed
to adequately encompass, for purposes of complying with the statute,
the advertisement of various subspecialities arguably within the larger
category (e.g., "auto accidents," "worker's compensation" and "defective products")?
A.

When Must a "Disclaimer"Be Included

Although the language of the subsection is clear, both the frequency with which recent Yellow Pages ads have failed to comply
with its terms and the seriousness with which some disciplinary authorities have treated such violations49 make the point worth belaempower this Court to second-guess state officials"). See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-2 (3d ed. 1978) (courts have generally been deferential to legislature, either due to appreciation of difficulty of legislature's job or out of inherent bias toward
judicial restraint). The statute, therefore, is upheld notwithstanding the fact that a more effective means for dealing with the problem might be posited by the court or litigant. Inasmuch as
some scholars have urged that the establishment of certification requirements tends to ensure
greater proficiency in the rendition of legal services, there appears to be a rational predicate for
the enactment of subsection (C). See generally M. PIRSIG AND K. KIRWIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 47 (4th ed. 1984).

Since 1971, a number of states, including California, Florida, New Jersey, New Mexico,
South Carolina and Texas, have adopted specialty certification programs. In addition,
supporters of the trend have urged that specialty certification will improve compentency,
help clients to select lawyers in a more informed manner and, by increasing efficiency,
reduce the cost of legal services.
M. PIRSIG AND K. KIRWIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 49
(4th ed. 1984).
In cases involving state prosecution of commercial speech, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the government must employ the "least restrictive means" capable of achieving
the desired objective. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04 n.15 (1982) (quoting Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 566, 577 (1980)). This

requirement is not applicable, however, where the issue is one of requiring additional disclosure, rather than protecting the dissemination of information, for "disclosure requirements
trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech."
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, U.S.
,
n.14, 105 S. Ct. 2265,
2282 n.14, 85 L. Ed.2d 652, 673 n.14 (1985).
49. See State Bar of Texas v. Daves, No. 84-504190 (Dist. Ct. of Lubbock County, 237th
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boring: Anytime there is any mention of an area of practice, some
statement concerning certification MUST be included, regardless of
whether certification is available in that particular area. The
mandatory language of the subsection explicitly states that a statement "must" be included both when the attorney is certified in the
"'area so advertised" and when he -is
not. The attorney placing the ad
has an option of additionally stating that certification is not available
in the area, if such is the case, but there is no option to completely fail
to include some type of statement if a field of law is mentioned. Thus,
in State Bar of Texas v. Daves,50 - the first reported case involving
subsection (C) - the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld a summary
judgment against an attorney who advertised uncontested divorces.5"
Judicial admissions conclusively established that the attorney was not
certified as a family law specialist, and he had failed to include any
disclaimer of certification in his newspaper advertisement.52
It should be noted that certain expressions which might not necessarily be thought of as defining bona fide areas of practice may be
treated as calling into play the disclaimer requirements of subsection
(C). Thus, a recent Ethics Opinion of the State Bar of Texas53 has
held that because an ad that stated an attorney was a "military attorney"54 while in the armed forces would leave both a civilian and a
member of the military with the "undeniable impression"5 5 that the
"attorney ha[d] expertise in the area of the law involving military personnel,"' 56 the ad must include proper disclaimers to comply with subsection (C) (2).

Judicial District of Texas, July 12, 1984) (violating DR 2-101(C)(2), six month suspension),
rev'd and rem., 691 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. 691 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ requested).
51. The Daves court was concerned mainly with the constitutionality of the rules governing lawyer advertising and the propriety of granting summary judgment on the record

made in the district court. See id. at 788-89. In view of the fact that the contested ad contained no language of any sort purporting to comply with subsection (C), there was no occasion for the court to extensively consider how that provision shoul be interpreted or what type

form of statement is sufficient to comply with its requirements.
52. See id. 790.
53. See State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of Code of Professional Responsibility Op. 424 (1985), reprinted in 48 TEX. B.J. 577, 577 (1985).

54. See id. at 577.
55. See id. at 577.
56. See id. at 577. The opinion concluded that military job titles may be included in an
advertisement, but titles which imply on area of expertise must contain proper disclaimers.

See id. at 577.
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What Language May Be Used
At face value, the statute mandates with emphatic certainty that

precise wording - contained therein in quotation marks -

be used to

claim or disclaim certification or to state that certification is not available. Were layout space not expensive, 7 were the visual appeal and
clarity of the ad not critical concerns, there might not be any valid
reason to attempt to avoid strict compliance or to ask whether other
terms could do as well. But these are very relevant considerations for
any practitioner electing to advertise in the Yellow Pages. Thus, the
question arises as to whether language other than that quoted in the
statute may suffice to protect the public interest.
For example, suppose that a solo practitioner advertises the availability of legal services in five areas - personal injury, criminal law,
military law, family law, and wills and probate. Suppose further that
he is board certified in the two areas last mentioned and that no certification is available in military law. Strict tracking of the language of
the subsection would seem to require the inclusion of a bulky statement something akin to the following:
Board Certified, Family Law - Texas Board of Legal Specialization.
Board Certified, Estate Planning and Probate - Texas Board of Legal
Specialization. Not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization
in Personal Injury Trial Law, Criminal Law or Military Law.58
Would it not be equally effective, from a public interest/informational standpoint, for the ad to state simply:
Board Certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization in Family
Law and Estate Planning and Probate Law only.
Similarly, rather than drop a footnote to the listing of "Military
Law" stating "No designation has been made by the Texas Board of
Legal Specialization for a Certificate of Special Competence in this
Area," would it be just as clear and be more readable for the ad to
state, "The State Bar of Texas Offers No Certification in Military
Law"? Or what about a simple "Certification Not Available"? Moreover, if these problems arise for the solo practitioner, one can easily
57. As an example, a 2"x2" ad in the 1985 San Antonio Yellow Pages would cost an
attorney $201.25 per month and a half page ad would cost $1,475.25 per month.
58. Perhaps the first two sentences of t' .e proposed entry could be merged to read "Board

Certified, Family Law and Estate Plannin&, and Probate-Texas Board of Legal Specialization," and yet still strictly comply with subsection (C). There is no precedent on the question.
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imagine the complexity of strict compliance where an ad is placed on
behalf of two or more attorneys who practice in multiple areas, in
which some are certified and others are not. Nothing less than an
exceptionally long, detailed series of statements would seem to be
required.
Fortunately, a strong argument can be made, based on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in In re R.M. ", that strict adher-

ence to the terminology set forth in the statute cannot be enforced. In
R.MJ., the State of Missouri required that when advertising areas of
practice, an attorney had to select from an approved list of category
designations, including the words "tort law" and "property law."'
Instead of employing the designated terms, the attorney advertised
that he engaged in a "personal injury" and "real estate" practice, and
used other words having no direct counterparts on the approved list,
because he believed the undesignated terms were more readily understood by the general public. 61 Recognizing that the terms used "present[ed] no apparent danger of deception," 62 "could scarcely mislead
the public," 63 and were "[i]ndeed.

.

.more informative,"'

the Court

held that a state may not mandate the use of particular language
where the words in fact used are true and not misleading.65 In view of

59. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
60. See id. at 195 n.6. The Missouri law allowed a lawyer to advertise his practice in one
of two ways. The attorney could opt for a general description of "General Civil Practice,"

"General Criminal Practice," or "General Civil and Criminal Practice." In the alternative, a
lawyer or law firm could use one or more of twenty-three specialty categories. See id. at 195
n.6. If, however, a general description was used, the attorney could not, in addition, use any of
the more specified descriptions. Furthermore, if a specialty description was advertised, the
attorney was forbidden to state any limitation of practice. Finally, the attorney or firm was
forbidden to deviate from the approved list. See id. at 195 n.6.
61. See id. at 196-97 n.8. The charged attorney advertised twenty-three areas of practice,
four of which conformed with the approved rule and eight descriptions not provided for by the
rule: ("contract," "aviation," "securities-bonds," "pension & profit sharing plans," "zoning
and land use," "entertainment/sports," "food, drug & cosmetic," and "communication").
Additionally, eleven areas advertised were in non-comformance with the rule: "tax," (taxation
law), "corporate" (corporation law and business organizations), "real estate" (property law),
"probate" and "wills & estate planning" (probate & trust law), "personal injury" (tort law),
"trials & appeals" (trial practice, appellate practice), "workmen's compensation" (workers'
compensation law), and "divorce-separation" and "custody-adoption" (family law).
62, See id. at 206.
63. See id. at 206.
64. See id. at 206.
65. See id. at 206-07. The Court emphasized that "the states retain the authority to regulate advertising that is inherently misleading or that has proved to be misleading in practice."
See id. at 207.
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this holding, it seems likely that, if the argument is raised, a court
construing subsection (C) would hold that an attorney may deviate
from the language quoted in the subsection, so long as he accurately
sets forth, in a way that is not misleading, all of the information that
the Code seeks to elicit.
For the practitioner seeking to travel this route, caution and clarity
are the apposite watchwords. There should not be any unnecessary
doubt left in the mind of the reader of the ad as to the statements'
meanings or to whom the statements pertain. The language used
must be at least as clear as that which it replaces. For example, suppose that a firm wishes its ad to name six attorneys (A, B, C, D, E,
and F) and four areas of practice, including family law, in which A is
certified. The ad states: "A is certified by the Texas Board of Legal
Specialization in Family Law only. The other attorneys in the firm
are not board certified in any area." Is this sufficient to comply with
subsection (C)? Presumably so. There is no doubt as to who is or is
not certified in which areas or who confers the certification. In contrast, if none of the attorneys in the example were certified in any
area, would it be sufficient to concisely state: "Not Board Certified"?
Here an affirmative answer would seem far less certain. At a minimum the ad leaves unclear the fact that it is individuals, not firms,
who can be certified and the fact that certification is conferred by a
particular board. Because the First Amendment tends to favor the
dissemination of more information, not less, where there is potential
for misleading the public,6 6 the practitioner would do better to err on
the side of completeness.
C.

How Should Subcategories Be Treated

The Texas Board of Legal Specialization confers certification in ten
specific areas: Civil Trial Law, Consumer Bankruptcy, Criminal
Law, Estate Planning & Probate, Family Law, Immigration & Nationality Law, Labor Law, Personal Injury Trial Law, Real Estate
Law, and Tax Law. Predictably, however, attorneys placing Yellow
Pages ads wish to attract the eye of the public by departing from the
strict rubric of these titles and referring to types of cases covered by

66. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977). The Court stated:
"[a]lthough, of course, the bar retains the power to correct omissions [in lawyer advertising]

that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less." See id. at 374-75.
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each general category. For example, under a heading in an ad entitled
"Family Law," or perhaps in lieu of such words altogether, the practitioner may desire to list such designations as "divorce," "annulment,"
"custody," "support," "visitation," "paternity," and "adoption," as
well as many others. Are such listing permissible? Clearly yes.67 The
Texas Code does not purport to confine attorneys to an approved list
of words. Such references do, however, create problems for complying with subsection (C).
Although the naming of subcategories may enable the reader to better understand what services the attorney offers, the variation between
those terms and the language used to express the disclaimer may leave
him unclear as to whether or not the attorney has been certified in a
particular area. For example, where an ad refers to worker's compensation, automobile accidents, defective products, and aviation crashes,
then states that the attorney is board certified in Personal Injury Trial
Law, will the average layman understand that certification has been
granted covering all of the named subcategories, or will he assume
that the statement refers to something else?
Mindful of these problems, the Professional Ethics Committee of
the State Bar of Texas has offered pertinent guidance in a recent ethics
opinion." Unfortunately, their recommendations69 tend toward even
greater complexity in Yellow Pages legal advertising by suggesting the
inclusion of disclaimers more lengthy than those already discussed.
Where, for example, an attorney who is board certified in Personal
Injury Trial Law advertises that he handles worker's compensation
cases, the committee states that the ad must disclose his board certification and, in addition, "should also include the caveat":

67. See State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Op. 418 (1984) (permissible to subdefine broad headings), reprintedin 47 TEX. B.J.
1118, 1118 (1984).
68. See id. at 1118.
69. Opinions of the Professional Ethics Committee are not binding on the Texas Supreme
Court. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 18(b) (Vernon's Supp. 1985). In addition, no decision has yet precisely defined their precedential force when cited to lower courts or
local grievance committees. Telephone interview between Christopher Warren and Dell
Wynn, Office of the General Counsel, State Bar of Texas (May 21, 1985). Inasmuch as the
members of the Committee are appointed by the Texas Supreme Court, and presumably are
well-qualified to hold such positions, it may reasonably be assumed that the opinions of the
Committee will normally be entitled to significant weight. For a brief overview of the operation of the Committee, see generally, J. Zunker, The Professional Ethics Committee, 46 TEX.
B.J. 720 (1983) (Professional Ethics Committee passes on proposed conduct).
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Workers' Compensation (or whatever the sub-area) is included in Personal Injury Trial Law. However, no7 designation has been made in
Workers' Compensation law as such." 1
Further, if the attorney placing the ad is not board certified in Personal Injury Trial Law, the committee says that the ad "must state
that he is" not certified "in Personal Injury Trial Law, which would
71
include Worker's Compensation.
Adherence to these suggested guidelines could technically clarify
many lawyer advertisements. And to the extent that such is reasonably possible without unduly impairing the visual appeal of the ad,
that undoubtedly is the preferred course for the practitioner. Yet in
many instances, the proposed method of clarification would exact a
high cost. Lawyer ads often list more than a half dozen sub-areas of
practice. Listing ten or a dozen is not uncommon, and some ads have
specified upwards of twenty.7 2 Presumably, this information is of use
to consumers who are in need of legal services. If, however, one requires practitioners to in effect "double-list" each sub-area - once in
the body of the ad and once in the disclaimer - it seems inevitable
that at some point the space required will become prohibitively expensive or the ad so visually unappealing, as to discourage the dissemination of this information. If board certification of an attorney did in
fact ensure that the client would obtain a higher quality of legal services, the trouble and risks inherent in this line of compliance might be
worth bearing. But as mentioned earlier, that proposition is at least
open to question.7"
A better alternative might be to require attorneys to clearly list any
sub-areas beneath a general category heading, at least to the extent
that the areas are subsumed by one of the certification fields.7 4 If this

70. See State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Op. 418 (1984), reprinted in, 47 TEX. B.J. 1118, 1118 (1984).
71. See id. at 1118.
72. For example, one advertisement on page 95 of the Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages
for the San Antonio area (August 1984) lists, in a readable, tasteful format, 22 subareas of
practice.
73. See Galton, The New Advertising Rules: Accentuating The Negative?, 45 TEX. B.J.
1420, 1420 (1982) (specialization or nonspecialization does not always denote lawyer
competency).
74. Very difficult problems can arise concerning whether or not a particular field is a
subcategory of an area in which certification is available. For example, is Real Estate Litigation a sub-area of Civil Trial Law? Or is it too closely related to the Real Estate Law certification that to allow one not certified in that area to so advertise might run a risk of confusion in
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suggestion is followed, it would then be possible to avoid a duplicative
recitation of that information in the disclaimer statements, without
risk of confusion. That is, if the ad listed five types of cases under the
heading "Civil Trial Law," then clearly stated that the attorney was
board certified in Civil Trial Law, it would seem to be pellucidly certain that the certification covered all of the sub-areas. Many attorneys
presently employ this format in their ads. So long as what the attorneys do is clear, it would appear that they might reasonably continue
the practice without fear of discipline. The recommendations of the
Professional Ethics Committee, while entitled to significant weight,
are not binding on the Texas Supreme Court7 5 , nor presumably on
lower courts or grievance committees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of guiding precedent on subsection (B), the best
course for the practitioner is to attempt in good faith to furnish prospective clients with the most accurate picture possible as to who will
likely provide legal services or how that decision will be made. If the
attorney paints such a picture, he will probably be safe from disciplinary action, for to fault him from failing to divine any other interpretation of this vague provision would unconstitutionally chill the
exercise of his First Amendment rights.
As to subsection (C), it is clear that any time an ad names an area
of practice or otherwise conveys the impression that the attorney has
special expertise in a given field, an appropriate disclaimer must be
included. Applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court
strongly suggest that the attorney need not precisely track the disclaimer language set forth in the statute, but to the extent that he fails
to do so, great care should be exercised to insure that prospective clients are fully and accurately apprised as to the certification credentials of those who are named. Where the ad refers to particular types
of cases or sub-areas, it should make clear, through wording or format, whether certification encompasses those fields.
Until such time as the relevant language is authoritatively interpreted or, perhaps better, revised, this is all that one can reasonably be
the eyes of the public. Full consideration of this and similar questions is beyond the scope of
this article.
75. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 18(b) (Vernon's Supp. 1985).
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expected to do in navigating the trouble-fraught waters of subsections
(B) and (C).

